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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a~3(2)(h), 0); §78-2-2(4) and 
§78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Is the Plaintiff entitled to have all the facts as presented and all of 
the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him? The 
standard is reconsideration of trial court's legal conclusion. Weineger v. Frorerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
Issue No. 2: Since the granting of a Motion for summary judgment denies the 
Plaintiff a trial on the merits, and since the Plaintiff demonstrated that there are genuine 
disputes with respect to the material issues of fact, is the moving party as a matter of law 
entitled to summary judgment? The standard is review of facts in light most favorable to 
party against whom Summary Judgment was entered. Estate Landscape and Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. vs, Mountain States Tel and Tel Co., 793 P,2d 415 (Ut Ct Ap 
1990). 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no material 
issues of fact in dispute based upon the evidence and record of whether or not the town of 
Levan had a valid master plan or zoning plan in effect at the time of the alleged adoption 
of the 30 foot set-back ordinance, which was allegedly adopted in 1980, 1981 or 1983. 
Did a failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the purported plan or 
ordinance, render the ordinance invalid? The standard is reconsideration of trial court's 
legal conclusion. Weineger v. Frorerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) Jachimek v, 
Superior Ct,, 169 Ariz. 317, 819 P.2d 487, 489 (1991). 
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Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err in enforcing a purported set-back 
ordinance aiiaiiisl (In; p»v-ov* iw*\ ,iml pre-existing structure of the appellant when the 
Town before and after the prosecution of the Appellant for a zoning set- f jack 
infringement, arbitrarily and prejudicially allowed other property owners in the town to 
const back area. And whether these occurrences 
constitute a bias in the enforcement of the alleged ordinance. The standard is correction 
of error. Frisbee v. K & K Constt.Co. 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984): Jachimekv, 
Superior Ct. 169 A riz. 317, 81* 2d 487, 489 (1991). 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err by refusing the request o J' I h e 1" I a i I 11111 I < 
introduce fence-line boundaries as evidence of multiple set-back violation, when the court 
ruled .il lri.il lliiil (In, 11 m n used lln/sc measurements and the word of the property owner 
in contradiction to and superseding the metes and bounds measurements introduced as 
evidence by the Plaintiff. Is acceptance of the word of the property owner for the 
property setback measurement. arbitrary enforcement and a failure at enforcement? The 
standard is correction of error. City of New Orleans vs. Levy. 233 La.844, 98 No, Jd I'" 10 
(1957). 
IssueNo.6. I lid the dial i > ml err in the method and a 4 1/2 month delay in 
relaying to the Plaintiff the town's denial of the building permit with no explanation or 
possibility given for correction as provided in the Town's building permit checklist. Does 
the town otherwise Ii n r a ,ltif\ fa issue a building permit upon the application of the 
owner if the changes would satisfy the terms of the permit and an inspection thereof. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
This case depends upon the proper interpretation of Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the following statutes: 
Valid Master or General Plan -
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-6 (1991) to have the powers afforded in chapter 9, the 
mayor shall appoint a board of adjustment 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-704(l)(ii) shall adopt ordinance for time to appeal 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-301 (1991) communities shall adopt a general plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-3 (1981) regulations to be in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-20 (1953) p&z duty of preparing master plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-302(1) p&z prepare, recommend general plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-204(1) (1991) p&z prepare, recommend general plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-302(2) (1991) p&z recommend maps, plats, charts, 
text for general plan 
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-3 03 (2)(a) (1991) legislative body hold public hearing 
on general plan 
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-303( 1) (1991) p&z hold public hearing on general 
plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-304 (1991) general plan amendments to comply with 
10-9-303 requirements 
Valid Zoning Plan -
Utah Code Annotated §10-3-704 (1977) required form of ordinance 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-401 (1991) legislative body may enact a zoning plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-204(2) (1991) p&z recommend zoning, maps, etc. 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-4 (1991) p&z shall prepare zoning text, maps 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-402(1) (1991) p&z shall make zoning plan, text, maps 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-402(2) (1991) legislative body hearing with 14 day 
newspaper notice 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-5 (1985) p&z to make zoning amendment, none 
without 15 day published notice 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-403 (1991) p&z to recommend zoning amendments 
and comply with 10-9-402 
Adherence, Bias and prejudice -
Utah Code Annotated §10-3-506 (1977) every resolution or ordinance shall be in 
writing before the vote is taken 
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Utah Code Annotated §10-3-603 (1977) Public records shall be kept and open 
Utah Code Annotated §10-3-605 (1979) the penalty for violation of 10-3-603 
Utah Code Annotated §10-3-702 (1977) city may pass municipal ordinances (they 
are not zoning ordinances) 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-2 (1953) Regulations shall be uniform throughout 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-21 (1953) Conformity required after the master plan 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-23 (1953) Street changes require public hearing 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-6(3) (1990) non-conforming uses may be continued 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-407, 408 (1991) allowing conditional and 
nonconforming use 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-15 (1953) judicial review must be before expiration 
of 30 days of the board of adjustment decision 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-18 (1953) temporary zoning only valid 6 months 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-404 (1953) temporary zoning only valid 6 months 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-704(l)(a), 1001(2), &1002(1) (1991) petition for 
relief of local decision 
83 AmJur.2d Zoning and planning plO (1992), failure to substantially comply 
renders invalid 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Court of Appeal has ruled, February 8, 2006, upon a motion for summary 
disposition by the appellee, that appellant Reynold Johnson, is the proper party plaintiff in 
this case: therefore, in this brief, whenever the term plaintiff or appellant is stated, it shall 
be used in the singular and shall refer to him.
 f 
In this appeal the appellant seeks a redetermination of the application of Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to the facts before the trial court. The 
plaintiff demonstrated that there are genuine disputes with respect to the courts finding 
with respect to material issues of fact 
On a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants, the trial court, on 
January 24,2005, found the defendants were entitled to a partial judgment as a matter of 
law and that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact as to: 
/. The Defendant properly denied Plaintiff a certificate of occupancy. 
2. The Plaintiff is ordered to comply with Town ordinances and State law. 
3. The Levan Town ordinance providing for a 30-foot setback for a home is valid 
and the ordinance was properly passed fulfilling the requirements set forth in 
Utah Code annotated Section 10-9-402. 
The Court denied Summary Judgment for either party regarding the issue of 
whether the setback ordinance has been uniformly enforced. The Court finds this issue 
raises significant issues of material fact that will require an evidentiary hearing. 
Then, on a motion for summary judgment brought by the Defendants, the trial 
court on August 15, 2005, after hearing metes and bounds evidence from the plaintiff of 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement regarding the Town's alleged 30 foot set-back 
ordinance, the court found: 
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/. The Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there was 
no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding the issue of arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. 
The trial court based its ruling upon Town of Alta v, Ben Hone Corp, U,C,of A, 
stating: "Generally, to raise a successful equitable defense against the enforcement of a 
zoning law, a landowner must first show exceptional circumstances warranting such a 
defense, "and the Court of Appeals also held in Town of Alta at p.80 3 that "....failure to 
enforce zoning for a time does not forfeit the power to enforce ". 
Appellant has filed this appeal and this brief addresses his claims for error by the 
court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In September, 1993 a structure was placed upon this property and subsequently 
used by the previous owner as a home (exhibit 1). For approximately 8 years prior to the 
Appellant purchasing the property in 2002, the prior owner lived there (exhibit 2,3,4). 
The town of Levan provided all utility services to the home and the retired owner was 
listed in the telephone directory, and the church directory (exhibit 5). The home was 
provided with satellite television and the owner was the churches communication 
specialist using his ham radio equipment inside the home. The structure was listed as a 
primary residential structure on the County tax record (exhibit 6). The owner landscaped 
the yard completely and constructed accessory buildings for chickens and a garden shop 
for his equipment and for the garden and orchard he kept up 1995 (exhibit 7). The owner, 
who had been retired, found it necessary to return to work at the age of 70 years and sold 
the property to the Plaintiff on October 16, 2002. 
The Plaintiff replaced an overhead door with a window and the Town notified the 
Plaintiff by letter that according to certain conditions relating to the extent of work and 
cost, a building permit might be necessary. The letter directed the Plaintiff to apply for a 
building permit to avoid further action (exhibit 8). The Plaintiff submitted an application 
in September 2003 and included in the application other improvements which were being 
considered (exhibit 9). The Town has a policy for issuing permits after the owners 
application is submitted (exhibit 10), the town did not return the permit showing approval 
or the requirements for approval, ask for the fee, or make any other response to the 
application until January 22, 2004, when the town sent a letter to the appellant (exhibit 
11) stating that a building permit had not been secured and that the requirements for a 
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certificate of occupancy had not been met and occupants were required to move. There 
was no reason given or opportunity stated so the Plaintiff might find a solution and use 
the property. Any changes to the property had been completed. 
The Building inspector left a notice on the door, on January 29,2004 (exhibit 12) 
The notice stated 4tyou did not obtain the required permit. Please take care of this'9. The 
Plaintiff had made the application for the permit and this was very confusing. 
On February 4, 2004, The Levan town attorney, Denton Hatch mailed a letter to 
the Plaintiff and stated that the plaintiff had committed two violations, needing a 
certificate of occupancy and a building permit (exhibit 13). The plaintiff had applied for 
a building permit clear back on September 4, 2003 and still had no knowledge of why a 
permit had not been issued. 
On February 11, 2004, (exhibit 14), the appellant was informed for the first time 
by the town attorney that the set-back requirement had not been met and a building permit 
had not been obtained. The Plaintiff had filed an application for building improvements 
and considering the Town's September 4,2003 letter and the interval between, justifiably, 
assumed that a permit was not necessary, like many other projects in the town. That letter 
suggested that the plaintiff might be required to obtain a permit and should apply for one. 
The Plaintiff had been without a response from the town for 4 1/2 months. The Town's 
published permit checklist (exhibit 10) provides an example of the procedure for issuing 
permits and the contingent approval, paragraph 3, which was not relayed to the Plaintiff. 
On March 29,2004, The town mayor sent a letter (exhibit 15), which notified the 
plaintiff that utility service would be shut off on April 10,2004. The letter also stated 
that the building was not in compliance, had not been approved for occupancy, and there 
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was not a building permit* This would obviously not give the Plaintiff any time for a 
board of adjustment appeal. 
The Plaintiff filed for injunctive relief in the Fourth District Court on 
April 12,2004. There was no sitting Board of Adjustment U.C.A. §10-9-6 (1991) {IQ 
have the powers afforded in chapter 9, the mayor shall appoint a board of adjustment], 
and there was no ordinance establishing a time for appeal to the board of adjustment. 
U.C.A. §10-9-704(l)(ii) (1995) [The legislative body shall enact an ordinance 
establishing a reasonable time for appeal to the board of adjustment,] 
After a meeting with the States Private Property Ombudsmen on June 14, 2004. 
The ombudsman followed up with a letter summarizing the meeting with "the front five 
feet of the building could only be used for garage, storage, and related garage uses. The 
balance of the building can be established as a home if it meets the code requirements for 
the minimum floor area for a home", (exhibit 16) 
On June 16, 2004, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Board of Adjustment in care of 
the City Hall (exhibit 17).. The letter described the situation and requested a board to 
include the house in the town's residential zoning. The plaintiffs letter indicated that the 
town wanted this home abandoned because the front 5 feet were in the setback area. The 
Plaintiff submitted that the use of the home would be similar to other properties in the 
district which were also too close to the front boundary and that other structures were not 
used according to the first intended purpose. (Page 2). The plaintiff was told that a board 
would have to be appointed, which is required by statute 
The Fourth District Court asked the Town to provide a letter describing what the 
Town expected of the plaintiff.. The response came from the town's attorney with 
12 
attachments from the building inspector June 29, 2004 (exhibit 18), and a suggestion that 
"you can apply for a variance if you desire to do so". 
The board was seated and the board ruled on July 13, 2004 (exhibit 19) denying 
the request for continued use of the property without giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to 
testify or consider the issues for review of arbitrary enforcement of the 30 foot setback, 
the home's use as a residence by the prior owner for nearly 10 years, and the sensible 
consideration that the house had been accepted by the town as the prior owners residence 
and provided with utilities for nearly 10 years-
Extensive argument and discovery followed culminating in two separate decisions 
by the Court the first regarding the validity of the Town's general plan and zoning and the 
second relating to acts of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the 30 foot setback 
ordinance. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In reviewing the facts before it, the trial court failed to use them in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff as required by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Court placed too much emphasis on the oral testimony of the Defendants and 
not enough on the evidence, law, and statutory requirements that bind the practice of the 
municipality. Further, the trial court failed to give equal weight to all of the language 
contained in the pleadings of the parties and thereby arrived at a decision which is 
inconsistent with the facts before it- In addition the court misinterpreted the law 
concerning the planning and zoning of a municipality and failed to grasp the actual extent 
of arbitrary enforcement of the set-back policy to which the defendants ascribed the 
denial of the plaintiffs building permit for improvements. 
I. IN A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FACTS AND ALL INFERENCES 
ARISING THEREFROM MUST RE CONSIDERED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO NON-MOVING PARTY 
Issue No. 1. In this action the Plaintiff is entitled to have all the facts as 
presented and all of the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light 
most favorable him. 
The Defendants9 Motions were brought under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure entitled "Summary Judgment". The Defendants filed statements before the 
trial court which were vigorously disputed by the Plaintiff and which a trier of fact could 
reasonably interpret either way. In this action, the Plaintiff is entitled to have all of the 
facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most 
favorable to him. Weineger vs. Frorerer Corp., 813P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
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Issue No. 2. Since the granting of a Motion for summary judgment denies 
the Plaintiff a trial on the merits, and since the Plaintiff demonstrated that there are 
genuine disputes with respect to the material issues of fact, is the moving party as a 
matter of law entitled to summary judgment?. 
The Plaintiff submits that this court must review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to him and since Plaintiff has demonstrated that there are genuine disputes with 
respect to material issues of fact, the moving party is not entitled to judgment Estate 
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. vs. Mountain States Tel and Tel Co,, 793, 
P. 2d 415 (Ut Ct App 1990). This Court has indicated that the mere "presence of a 
dispute as to material facts disallows the granting of a summary judgment Bill Brown 
Realty, Inc. vs. Abbott, 562 P2d 238 (Utah 1977). Further that, "it takes only one sworn 
statement to dispute averments on the other side of controversy to create issue of fact, 
precluding surmnary judgment Holbrook Co,, vs. Adams, 542 P2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
11. TO BE VALID, A ZONING PLAN OR AMENDMENT MUST BE ADOPTED 
ACCORDING TO THE LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Issue No. 3. Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no material 
issues of fact in dispute based upon the evidence and record of whether or not the 
town of Levan had a valid master plan or zoning plan in effect at the time of the 
alleged adoption of the 30 foot set-back ordinance. Did a failure to strictly follow 
the statutory requirements in enacting the purported plan and/or ordinance, render 
the ordinance invalid? The standard is reconsideration of trial court's legal 
conclusion 
Based upon the evidence and record the court should interpret the applicable Utah 
law to determine whether or not the town of Levan had a valid master plan and zoning 
plan prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance. The appellant specifically challenges 
the trial court's finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of any 
part of the requirements of a valid 30 foot setback ordinance The Town was asked in 
discovery to provide all evidence of it's zoning and general plan for the court. It failed to 
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do so. The records are required to be kept by law. (U.C.A. 10-3-603) and shall be kept in 
writing before a vote is taken (U.C.A. (10-3-506) 
III. A MUNICIPALITY MAY NOT ENFORCE IT'S SET-BACK ORDINANCE 
ARBITRARILY OR WITH PREJUDICE 
Issue No. 4. Did the trial court err in enforcing a purported set-back 
ordinance against the pre-owned and pre-existing structure of the appellant when 
the Town before and after the prosecution of the Appellant for a zoning set-back 
infringement, arbitrarily and prejudicially allowed other property owners in the 
district to construct and remain in the alleged set-back area. Do these practices 
constitute a bias in the enforcement of the alleged ordinance. The standard is 
correction of error. Frisbee v. K & K Const,.Co. 676 P.2d 387,389 (Utah 1984): 
Jachimek v. Superior Ct.? 169 Ariz. 317,819 P.2d 487, 489 (1991). 
Based upon the evidence of similar violations submitted to the Court, the Court 
should determine that the Town of Levan has pursued an arbitrary course of setback 
enforcement which would bring about the very condition which led the Appellant to this 
Court. 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err by refusing the request of the Plaintiff to 
introduce fence-line boundaries as evidence of multiple set-back violation, when the 
court ruled at trial, that the Town used fenceline measurements and the word of the 
property owner in contradiction to and superseding the metes and bounds 
measurements introduced as evidence by the Plaintiff? Is the use of the property 
owners word for a setback measurement a perfect example of arbitrary 
enforcement? The standard is correction of error. City of New Orleans vs. Levy. 
233 La.844, 98 So.2d 210 (1957). 
The Appellant submits that evidence and testimony presented to the Court shows a 
lack of regard in the measurement of setback throughout the Town. The word or 
measurement of the property owner is not verified. Properties are issued permits and 
structures are completed within the setback area without prosecution. The Appellant was 
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singled out. The measurements from the fence line will portray the same arbitrary 
enforcement for multiple properties in the district and, therefore, discrimination. 
Issue No 6. Did the trial court err in allowing the method and the delay in 
relaying to the Plaintiff the town's denial of the building permit and explaining the 
specific reason for the denial as setback encroachment and does the town otherwise 
have a duty to issue a building permit upon application by the owner, if the 
modifications would satisfy the terms of the permit and an inspection thereof. 
Proper handling of the Town's building permit decision and conveyance of 
expectations to the applicant must be handled in a manner to protect the privilege and 
right of a property owner to own and use property without unreasonable or unjust 
interference. The Appellant did not receive the consideration he deserved in building 
permit notification and processing. The Trial Court has a duty to issue a building permit 
when the provisions of the permit would satisfy the terms and conditions of an inspection. 
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ARGUMENT 
ZONING VALIDITY 
Jachimekv. Superior CT^ 169Ariz. 317, 819P.2d487, 489 (1991). Cities (and 
towns) must strictly comply with the statute delegating them the authority to act. Failure 
to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders the 
Ordinance invalid. 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P2d 183 (Utah 1986). Failure to strictly follow 
the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid, also Melvin v. 
Salt Lake County, 536 P. 2d 133 (Utah 1975); Anderson at 199. This well established rule 
is followed by the great majority of jurisdictions. Annot, 96 A.L.R.2d 449 (1964) see 
Town of Beverly Shores Plan Commission v. Enright, 463N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1984 (statute 
required municipality to publish two notices in newspaper within ten days of hearing 
—ordinance invalidated (at 180); The pretrial order placed upon West Jordan the 
burden of making a prima facie showing that it had satisfied the requirements of section 
10-9-25. We hold as a matter of law that it failed to carry this burden. 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 21 P. 2d 246, (Utah App 2001) 1. Appellate court 
first reviews the trial court's factual findings under the t( clearly erroneous " standard and 
then reviews trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. 2. Cities must strictly comply 
with enabling statues delegating them the authority to regulate land use through zoning 
ordinances, and thus failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the 
ordinance renders it invalid. 3.Statutory requirement that map be included with text of 
proposed zoning ordinance is mandatory rather than directory because the existence of a 
map is the essence of the enabling statute. 10-9-402 4. Zoning ordinance enacted without 
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a map, or with a map that does not accurately represent the commission's 
recommendations for zoning, does not strictly comply with enabling statute and is, 
therefore, invalid U.C.A.1953, 109-402. (at 247 [2] \7) The authority to regulate land 
use through zoning ordinances is conferred on municipalities by the state through 
enabling statutes, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401-409 (1999) As such, "cities must 
strictly comply with the statute delegating them the authority to act. " Jachimek v. 
Superior Ct 169 Ariz. 317, 819 P\2d48?',489 (1991). Consequently, 'failure to strictly 
follow the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid. ". Call v. 
City of West Jordan. 727 P2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). Schwarz v. City of Glendale, 190 
Ariz. 508, 950 P.2d 167, 169 (Ariz.CtApp. 1997) ((<Municipalities must strictly follow the 
statutory procedure to enact a zoning ordinance."); Stockwell v. City ofRitzville, 34 
Wassh. App. 526, 663 P.2d 151(1983)(upholding trial court's determination that "the 
ordinance was invalidly enacted due to the Council's failure to comply strictly" with the 
enabling statute), (at 248[3,4] ) Thus, an ordinance enacted without a map, or with 
a map that does not accurately "represent the commission's recommendation for 
zoning," does not strictly comply with Utah's enabling statute and is therefore, invalid. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402(^11) Appellees offered no evidence to rebut Appellant's 
testimony and did not enter into evidence the map they claim was the official 
map entitled "Existing Land Use Map. " Upon close examination of the record, 
we find no evidence to support the trial court's finding that a map fulfilling the statutory 
requirement exists, [example for Appellant is the notice of hearing, multiple minutes of 
passing the ordinance, a master plan, documents, text and map are not in evidence to 
support the trial court's finding]. 
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The Defendants avoided the Plaintiffs requests for the names of the 
planning and zoning committee which were to have recommended the general plan and 
zoning plan and the setback ordinance for the town to show compliance with the statutory 
requirement for valid zoning.U.C.A 10-9-4. 
The Town of Levan was asked in discovery to provide all evidence of it's zoning 
and general plan and did not, stating in its reply that it would do so when it was 
convenient, but failed to do so. The records are required to be kept by law. 
(U.C A. 10-3-603) and shall be in writing before a vote is taken (U.C.A. 10-3-506) 
NOTICE 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P2d 183 (Utah 1986). Failure to strictly follow 
the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid, also Melville v. 
Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 (Utah 1975); Anderson at 199. This well established rule 
is followed by the great majority of jurisdictions. Annot, 96 A.L.R.2d 449 (1964) see 
Town of Beverly Shores Plan Commission v. Enright, 463N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1984 (statute 
required municipality to publish two notices in newspaper within ten days of hearing 
—ordinance invalidated (at 180); The pretrial order placed upon West Jordan the 
burden of making a prima facie showing that it had satisfied the requirements of section 
10-9-25. We hold as a matter ojlaw that it failed to carry this burden. 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 21 P. 2d 248, (Utah App 2001) C. (7). The purpose 
of statue governing preparation and adoption of zoning ordinance is to ensure that 
members of the public receive adequate notice of ordinances that may affect their 
property 
The town has presented a posted notice reflecting the passing and adoption of an 
ordinance May 1, 1983 (zoning 4a) . Since the notice represents that the ordinance has 
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all ready been passed it could in no way have been issued by the planning committee 14 
days before a hearing for community involvement into the proposed ordinance and a 
required hearing for the legislative body of the Tow. This notice would have publicized 
a date in the future for the hearing of public comment, which would require another 14 
day notice before it could have been adopted on May 11, 1983. Notice requires 
publication in a newspaper of local circulation (U.CA. 10-9-402(23) A thorough search 
of the local newspaper revealed no such notice was ever published. 
The appellant researched issues of the local Newspaper for publication prior to the 
March 12, 1980, February 11, 1981, and May 11, 1983 council minutes of the passing of 
this ordinance and found no publication or notice of a zoning hearing and there is no 
account of a general plan, zoning plan, text, plat or description. This notice fails to satisfy 
the notice requirements of the state. (U.CA. §10 chapter 9) 
The town published a notice stating it had adopted the Uniform building Code on 
April 7, 1983, (zoning 4b) This was very close to the professed May 11,1983 minute 
entry and notice date. This indicates that the town knew how to publish a notice in the 
newspaper. The town also published notices of Council meetings with date and times in 
the newspaper. It failed to publish the required hearing notice for public input into a 
zoning plan, a general plan, ordinance or amendment on any occasion 
The purported hearing notice (zoning 4a) is not a hearing notice at all and did not 
portray any such thing in it's language. It can be read to determine that it is a notice of 
the addition of the set back ordinance to the building code. This was truly an error of the 
Court. The Court accepted the notice as evidence of a 14 day notice for public hearing for 
input into a planned zoning setback ordinance. The notice requires statutory information 
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to be included, test, plat, impact etc. Two notices and public hearings are required to pass 
a zoning plan, if this is what the Town considered it's zoning plan. 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). "The Legislature has 
set forth specific procedures that a municipality must follow to exercise the powers 
granted to it. In exercising the powers granted to it by the act, the planning commission 
shall prepare regulations governing the subdivision of land within the municipality. A 
public hearing shall be held thereon The Commission must first prepare the 
regulations City planning and zoning commission failed to comply with statutory 
requirements of public hearing prior to adoption of ordinance where advance notice 
of purpose of meeting was not provided to public, , and public did not have 
opportunity to express their views; it was not sufficient that ordinance was adopted at 
regularly scheduled city council meeting, U.C.A.1953, 10-9-1 to 10-9-30. (at 183) In 
requiring a public hearing, our legislature contemplated that interested parties would 
have an opportunity to give their views, pro and con, regarding a specific legislative 
proposal, and thereby aid the municipal government in making its land use decisions. 8A 
E.McQuillon, The Law of Municipal Corporations 21 25.251 (rev.3d ed., 1976); ... We 
hold that because the statute calls for a public hearing our legislature contemplated 
something more than a regular city council meeting held, so far as the record here 
discloses, without specific advance notice to the public... See also Schwarz v. City of 
Glendale, 190 Ariz. 508, 950 P.2d 167, 169 (Ariz.Ct.App 1997).also Melville v. Salt Lake 
County, 536 P.2d 133 (Utah 1975); Anderson at 199 
PROOF OF ADOPTION 
Utah Code Annotated §10-3-603 (1977), §10-3-1212(2) (1981) [Public records] 
The Governing body of each municipality shall keep a journal of its proceeding. The 
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books, records, account and documents of each municipality shall be kept at the office of 
the recorder and approved copies shall be open and available to the public during 
regular business hours for examination and copying. Utah Code Annotated §10-3-605 
(1979) [Penalty] Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of Section 10-3-603or 
604 without just cause shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
On March 23,2005, the Defendants Answers failed or avoided response to provide 
the documentation requested by the Plaintiff, on March 18,2005. 
On May 13, 2005, The Defendants filed a motion to limit future discovery 
although they hadn't yet responded to the discovery they were complaining of. 
On June 4, 2005, The Defendants have not responded the Plaintiffs discovery 
requests and now seek to avoid therii. 
On June 21, 2005, the Plaintiff answered on page 10 that the documents he needed 
for trial were to have been submitted by the Defendants in discovery and addresses of 
non-compliant structures were repeated from 2-28-05. 
The Town of Levan was asked in discovery to provide all evidence of it's zoning 
and general plan and would not, stating in its reply that it would do so when it was 
convenient. The records are required to be kept by law. (U.C.A. 10-3-603) and shall be in 
writing before a vote is taken (U.C.A. 10-3-506) 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). Because of problems 
encountered by plaintiffs in its discovery of information in the possession of West Jordan 
and because of our decision in Bansberry Development Corp. v South Jordan City 631 
P,2d 899 (Utah 1981), the trial court issued a pretrial order which placed on West 
Jordan the burden of producing evidence on several issues. These issues may be 
condensed into and (2) whether the ordinance had been adopted according to 
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statutory requirements. It is necessary in this opinion to treat only the second issue. 
West Jordan was required at the threshold to present prima facie evidence that the city 
had followed the statutory requirements contained in U.C.A., 1953, §§ 10-9-1 to-30 in 
enacting the ordinance the legislature has set forth specific procedures that a 
municipality must follow to exercise the powers granted to it: In exercising the powers 
granted to it by the act, the planning commission shall prepare regulations governing the 
subdivision of land within the municipality. A public hearing thereon shall be held by the 
legislative body. (at 182) as mentioned above, the pretrial order placed upon West 
Jordan the burden of making a prima facie showing that it had satisfied the 
requirements We hold as a matter of law that it failed to carry this burden. [2] 
One's imagination must be stretched beyond rational limits to accept the master plan 
public hearing as satisfying the public hearing requirement 
The Town submitted an affidavit from ex-mayor Golden Mangelson (zoning 5) He 
stated (1) he was the mayor from 1979 to 1989 (false) The council session minutes, of 
record, show he was the councilman who made the motion to pass the zoning ordinance 
in question in 1980 and 1981 (exhibit A-la, A-2a). (2) The ordinance was posted in three 
public places (manipulation) this notice was not the 14 day notice it was represented to 
be). (4) 15 day notice was posted and Town complied with state law. (false) there was no 
15 day notice or general plan or zoning plan plat, map description, or zoning committee. 
(6) Town held a public hearing (false) even the notice submitted was not for a public 
hearing nor is there evidence of a hearing. (7) zoning ordinance was approved by the 
planning commission and submitted to the council for adoption, (false) no proof of a 
zoning committee, or minutes of any consideration of an ordinance other that the council 
meeting stating the ordinance was brought on by motion and passed.. (8) since I was 
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mayor the Town has enforced the setback requirements in a uniform and consistent 
manner, (false) even the present mayor has testified at trial that other administrations did 
not. (7/21/05 Trial Transcript 9,16-24; 63,11-23; 77,13-19) 
The evidence of planning and zoning is blatantly missing. The Plaintiff 
repeatedly attempted to impress the Court with the lack of a zoning record.. The Court 
erred in the interpretation of the facts before it. The documents (zoning 6,7, and 8) would 
further suggest that there was no Master Plan existing as required by statute 
(U.C.A. 10-9-204, 10-9-301, 10-9-302, 10-9-303) Since the documents show that the 
Town is still considering adopting a general plan and a zoning plan to get grants etc. 
LEVAN ZONTNG RECORD 
The Town submitted documents purported to support its statutory compliance for a 
master plan and zoning plan, and a 30 foot setback ordinance The Town did not provide 
a General Plan, a Zoning Plan, a street plat, a map, a text or description of the purpose 
and scope of zoning, .names and record of a zoning commission, minutes or record of the 
Town's consideration or involvement of the community in the zoning process, or a 
legitimate notice and proof of any hearing. 
(zoning la) Minutes of a March 12, 1980 regularly scheduled town council 
meeting, "Golden Mangelson made a motion that from this date the property owner be 30 
ft. from any city street and 8 ft from the neighbors property line, seconded by Marion 
Wankier and approved by all" There is no evidence on this date that the Town has a 
general plan with maps, plats, charts and descriptive text which is necessary before this 
ordinance can be passed 
(zoning lb) The town has submitted this copy of an undated ordinance titled 
Ordinance to add to the Levan Town Building Code which may or not have been drafted 
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at the same time but was submitted as the Town's Ordinance for a 30 foot set back listed 
in paragraph 4. 
In order to adopt this as a valid zoning ordinance the State has the following 
statutory requirements including a sitting planning commission, general plan, zoning plan, 
maps, plats, text, description, hearing, and notice of hearing. None of the statutory 
requirements have been met by the alleged ordinance. These statutes are strictly 
enforced. Further, passing a zoning ordinance is very different from passing a municipal 
ordinance, which is the procedure used in this case. Zoning ordinances do not simply 
pass in council meeting and attach to a building code like other municipal ordinances, 
[examples of municipal ordinances in difference to zoning ordinances might be traffic 
control, waste disposal or utility services]: 
-Utah Code Annotated §10-9-3 (1981), "Such regulations shall be made in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan " §10-9-301(1) (1991) "In order to accomplish 
the purposes set forth in this chapter, each municipality shall prepare and adopt a 
comprehensive, long-range general plan " 
-Utah Code Annotated §10-9-4 (1983), " The planning commission shall, make 
and certify to the legislative body a zoning plan, including both the full text of the zoning 
ordinance and maps, and representing the planning commission's recommendation for 
zoning the municipality.....", 
-Utah Code Annotated §10-9-302 (1991) (l)(a) "The Planning commission shall 
make and recommend to the legislative body a proposed general plan ..." 
-Utah Code Annotated §10-9-302(2) "The general plan with the accompanying 
maps, plats, charts and descriptive and explanatory matter, shall show the planning 
commission's recommendations for the development of the territory covered by the 
plan, " 
-Utah Code Annotated §10-9-5 (1985) [zoning ordinances --] (1) No zoning 
ordinance, map or amendment thereto may be adopted until the legislative body has given 
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at least 15 days published notice of the time, place, and purpose at which the zoning 
ordinance, map, or amendment is to be considered and public comment heard. (2) No 
zoning ordinance, map or amendment thereto may be adopted by the legislative body 
unless the planning commission has reviewed and made recommendations to the 
legislative body regarding that ordinance, map or amendment 
(zoning 2a) Minutes of a February 11, 1981 regularly scheduled town council 
meeting, "Golden Mangelson made a motion that the Town ofLevan is a residential area 
requiring any building be 20 ft from the street Residential be back SO ft, seconded by 
Joe Jensen and approved by all" There is no evidence on this date that the Town has a 
general Plan with maps, plats, charts and descriptive text which is necessary before this 
ordinance can be passed, 
(zoning 2b) The town also submitted this copy of the same ordinance with a 1-82 
hand written at the top margin and titled Ordinance to add to the Levan Town Building 
Code, with an additional retyped 2 column version (zoning 2c) of the same code titled 
Town ofLevan Zoning and Planning with Ordinance No. 1-82 substituted in type for the 
hand written 1-82 on the prior document. These may or may not have been drafted at the 
same time as the ordinance that was passed on February 11, 1981, but are dated '82 which 
would indicate a date written after the minutes of passing. This was submitted as the 
Town's Ordinance for a 30 foot set back listed in paragraph 4 of the ordinance. 
In order to adopt this as a valid zoning ordinance the State has the following 
statutory requirements including a sitting planning commission, general plan, zoning plan, 
maps, plats, text, description, hearing, and notice of hearing. None of the statutory 
requirements have been met by the alleged ordinance. These statutes are strictly 
enforced. Further, passing a zoning ordinance is very different from passing a municipal 
ordinance, which is the procedure used in this case. Zoning ordinances do not simply 
pass in council meeting and attach to a building code like other municipal ordinances. 
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[examples of municipal ordinances in difference to zoning ordinances might be traffic 
control, waste disposal or utility services]: 
(zoning 2d) The Town submitted an amended copy of (zoning 2c) using the 
altered document to change the acceptable lot size for homes, (section 1)? from original 
quarter acre to /za/f acre with a handwritten entry, no hearing, text of explanation, or 
record of statutory adoption accompanies this change. This amendment, of course, is 
invalid, but is being enforced. This amendment requires the same strict statutory 
complicity as the entire zoning ordinance does. This is nothing less than a good example 
of the negligence and disregard the town maintains in its zoning adoption policy. The 
statutory adoption requirements for this amendment are still pertinent requiring a sitting 
planning commission, general plan, zoning plan, maps, plats, text, description, hearing, 
and notice of hearing. None of the statutory requirements have been met by the alleged 
amendment. These statutes are strictly enforced. Further, amending a zoning ordinance 
is very different from passing a municipal ordinance, the procedure for passing a 
municipal ordinance was used in all of these zoning cases. Zoning amendments do not 
simply pass in council meeting. 
-Utah Code Annotated §10-9-304 (1991) [Amendment of plan] The legislative 
body may amend the general plan by following the procedures required by Section 
10-9-303 
(zoning 3a) Minutes of a May 11, 1983 regularly scheduled town council 
meeting, '"Building code ordinance: Building Code Ordinance #1-82, adding to the 
Levan Town Building Code was passed by the board, Mr, Spring moved that the 
ordinance to add to the building code be passed. Mr, Paystrup seconded the motion. The 
roll call vote went as follows; Mr, Paystrup-aye, Mr, Spring-aye, Mr, Jensen-aye, Mr. 
Christensen-aye, Mayor Mangelson-aye." 
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(zoning 3b) This is the latest retyped version, the same language and the 30 foot 
setback in section 4, as the March 12, 1980 ordinance. A May 11, 1983 date is 
substituted for the 1-82 . There is still a total absence of statutory compliant 
documentation. This version of the same ordinance has appeared from nowhere with a 
new title and "Exhibit A" appearing on the top of the page. 
(zoning 4a) The town has presented its evidence of statutory compliance with the 
required notice and hearing with the submission of a posted notice reflecting the passing 
and adoption of this same 1980 ordinance May 1, 1983. Since the notice represents that 
the ordinance has all ready been passed it could in no way have been issued by the 
planning committee 14 days before a hearing for community involvement into the 
proposed ordinance and a required hearing for the legislative body of the Tow. This 
notice would have publicized a date in the future for the hearing of public comment, 
which would require another 14 day notice before it could have been adopted on May 11, 
1983. The appellant researched the local Newspaper for publication prior to the March 
12, 1980, February 11,1981, and May 11, 1983 council minutes of the passing of this 
ordinance and found no publication or notice of a zoning hearing and there is no account 
of a general plan, zoning plan, text, plat or description. This notice fails to satisfy the 
notice requirements of the state. (U.C.A. §10 chapter 9) 
(zoning 4b) The town published a notice stating it had adopted the Uniform 
building Code on April 7, 1983, This was very close to the professed May 11,1983 
minute entry and notice date. This indicates that the town knew how to publish a notice 
in the newspaper. The town also published notices of Council meetings with date and 
times in the newspaper. It failed to publish the required hearing notice for public input 
into a zoning plan, a general plan, ordinance or amendment on any occasion 
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(Zoning 5) The Court used the affidavit of ex-mayor Golden Mangleson without 
any supporting documentation. This was so obviously unsubstantiated. There is no map, 
plat, description, text, zoning committee, notice to public, or even minutes to indicate the 
consideration or effort to general plan or zone the town. This was a malicious attempt at 
deceiving the court. Not worthy of further comment. 
-Utah Code Annotated §10-9-20 (1953) [Function and duties of commission -
master plan] "It shall be the function and duty of the planning commission, after holding 
public hearings, to make and adopt and certify to the legislative body, a master plan for 
the physical development of the municipality, " 
1 R, Anderson, American Law of Zoning §4.11 (2d ed.1976). Notice, to be 
effective, must alert the public to the nature and scope of the ordinance that is finally 
adopted. Id at 200. Failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the 
ordinance renders it invalid. Melville V. Salt Lake County, 536 P. 2d 133 (Utah 1975); 
Anderson at 199 
ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT 
Salt Lake County vs Dan L. Kartchner 552 P.2d 138 (Utah 1976) [5] A statute of 
similar import was interpreted in City of Snyder v. D.M. Cogdell, Texas Civ. App., 342 
S. W.2d 201 (1980). There the court stated the language of the statute did not destroy the 
discretion of a court, and did not require the issuance of an injunction as a matter of law 
in every type and circumstance of violation. Further, the statute did not nullify the rule 
that under the circumstances of a particular case, the court, in the exercise of its 
equitable powers, may deny injunctive relief against the violation of a zoning ordinance. 
An injunction will be denied where the granting of it would be inconsistent with basic 
principles of justice and equity, even though it is within the scope of relief available in 
equity courts to enjoin violations of zoning laws. 8A EMcQuillon, The Law of Municipal 
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Corporations 21 25.251 (rev.3ded, 1976) [6-8](at 139) The court will consider 
the equities between the parties and under some circumstances deny equitable relief, 
because a great injury will be suffered by defendant because of a mandatory injunction, 
with little or no benefit to complainant. Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building 
Co., 89 Utah 456,517,57 P.2d 1099 (1936) The matter here for decision bears a distinct 
factual similarity to City of New Orleans vs. Levy, 233 La. 844, 98 So. 2d 210 (1957). 
There the City sought a mandatory injunction to compel defendant to remove aplastic 
roof The roof was in violation of a zoning ordinance because it covered an entire 
courtyard. The ordinance required 20 percent of the space to be open. The record 
disclosed the existence of similar violations against which no injunction had been sought 
The court noted five specific parcels in the vicinity where the courtyards were completely 
covered. The court denied the injunction sought by the City, because of its discriminatory 
practices in enforcement of the ordinance. It pointed to these acts of discrimination 
noting them as violations of principles of equity (page 218 of 98 So.2d.) Having 
originally held that the City of New Orleans practiced specific instances of unfair 
discrimination, pursuing a course of conduct naturally calculated, if not deliberately 
intended, to bring about the very condition which led it to the portals of equity, we, as a 
court of equity, will be closed and the said applicant held remedyless. Court will consider 
equities between parties and under some circumstances deny equitable relief because a 
great injury will be suffered by defendant because of a mandatory injunction, with little 
or no benefit to complainant. [9,10] Witnesses for the county conceded at least six 
similar violation of the setback ordinance within the vicinity of defendant's property, and 
there was no evidence to indicate any attempt to enforce the zoning law in these other 
instances. The discriminatory manner in which the ordinance has been enforced by 
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plaintiff is a sufficient ground to deny equitable relief A mandatory injunction will never 
be granted where it might operate inequitably or oppressively Peck v. State ex reL 
Department of Highways (Okl). 350 P =.2d 948 (1960), Existence of six similar 
violations of setback zoning ordinance within vicinity of carport erected in violation of 
ordinance indicated that ordinance had been enforced in discriminatory manner and 
constituted sufficient ground for denial of mandatory injunction requiring removal of 
carport 
FENCELINE MEASUREMENT 
The Plaintiff requested a set aside of the courts decision to dismiss the Plaintiffs 
complaint. In the request, the Plaintiff asked the court for an opportunity to substitute and 
measure setbacks from the fenceline since this was the reason provided in denying the 
Plaintiffs exhibit of similar properties with setback violation, (see affidavit September 
28, 2005, Plaintiffs Motion for Set Aside %i).. The Town, at trial, had denied setback 
violations by offering to the court, that when issuing building permits, the acceptable 
method of determining the setback was a measurement from the fenceline to the house. 
The town stated that since the town was laid out improperly by survey, that survey 
measurements were not necessarily valid. This was rather a late confession. The entire 
history of the case had never suggested that the measurements submitted by the plaintiff 
would be unacceptable and the Plaintiffs measurements were never investigated and 
rebutted or affirmed. (Trial page 63,11: 77,13. The measurements from the fence line 
will show the same setback infringement on multiple properties in the district and, 
therefore, the arbitrary enforcement and discrimination. 
SETBACK MEASUREMENT 
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On April 14, 2005, Plaintiff requested building permits for 52 addresses of homes 
with setback violation and platted town street information etc. their own setbacks and the 
town trusted them. (May 19, 2005 response page 11) This process allows for 
discrimination and enforcement chaos. This is a perfect example of the arbitrary 
imposition of the setback policy and failure to follow a policy to avoid discriminatory 
practice in the enforcement of setback control that the Plaintiff is complaining of. The 33 
building permits provided with this response (setback exhibit), show unsubstantiated 
setback measurement "Levari Town home owners were allowed to measure their own 
setbacks and the Town trusted them to comply with the ordinance ". (Response page 12) 
Many of the building permits are absent setbacks entirely or portray contradictory 
measurements. (Defendants' Answers 5-19-05) The Town states it uses these 
measurement which were unsubstantiated and are the word of the property owner. 
Permits for structures within the set-back area were issued anyway, both before and after 
the filing of this action. The Town states that there has been no intentional 
discrimination, (page 9) but admits to known violations of noncompliant properties 
receiving building permits (page 2) and (Trial Transcript 7/21/05,9(16-24); 63(11-23), 
77,(13-19) Can there be a better example of arbitrary enforcement or non-existent 
enforcement for the ordinance of setback than which the Town uses. 
The town agreed that permits were issued and houses constructed in the setback 
area and were not prosecuted because the town was not aware of the violation and the 
building permits had all ready been issued. The building permits which were brought into 
evidence by the defendants, many of which were found in contradiction to the actual 
measurements specified on the building permits, were stated to be approved by the town 
because the town accepted the word of the applicant without verification. This objective 
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is purely arbitrary which renders the enforcement on the Plaintiff discriminatory. The 
discrimination is obvious, the plaintiffs home could have been issued a permit at the 
onset for a home and remodel and the Town would have accepted his word for the 
setback distances. The home was given a permit as a garage and used for a residence by 
the prior owner for years, as other properties were converted and used as residences, and 
for manufacturing and contracting, (conversions 1-18) Converting a garage to a house 
has no ordinance restriction in the Town of Levan. The plaintiff was singled out. 
Additionally,, since the filing of the plaintiffs case, the town has approved more building 
permits for houses in the setback area. The court was provided metes and bounds 
evidence of these at trial. The court ignored the plaintiffs evidence because the 
defendants afforded more importance to the word of the building permit applicant than to 
assuring itself that the measurements were accurate. 
The Court asked for measurement of homes provided with building and 
occupancy permits when the homes were in the front setback area. The Plaintiff provided 
over 50 instances of encroachment into the set-back area using both line measurement 
and satellite global positioning measurements with addresses for the properties 6-21-05, 
2-28-05, 3-8-05,4-14-05 and (Plaintiffs Answer 2-28-05 Page 2) (setback 3) . The 
Court was not ruling on the veracity of the Plaintff s evidence but found that it raises 
significant issue as to material fact that will require an evidentiary hearing . The Town 
doesn't dispute that properties are in the setback area. The Town suggests that the 
non-compliant properties have not been measured but were given permits, (pleadings 
dated 5-19-05, page 3,) 
GARAGE CONVERSION 
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On March 8, 2005, The Plaintiff responded to the Defendant's letter wanting to 
know if 190 West 300 north was the only example of a garage converted to a residence. 
The Plaintiff submitted not only another example of this discrimination but of the 
uncertainty of the streets, the setback violations in the Golden Mangelson subdivision and 
the Town managers home setback violation. 
The Plaintiff has record of at least 2 other garages converted to homes without 
building permits and many bams, garages, craft store and sheds converted to purposes for 
which they were not originally intended even for uses not residential in the residential 
district.(conversions exhibit) and (Plaintiffs Answer 2-28-05 Page 10) and (Plaintiffs 
Answer 3-4-05) 
The discrimination is obvious, the plaintiffs home could have been issued a 
permit at the onset as a home and remodel and the Town would have accepted his word 
for the setback distances. The home was given a permit as a garage and used for a 
residence by the prior owner for years, as were other properties converted and used as 
residences, and for manufacturing and contracting, (conversions 1-15) Converting a 
garage to a house has no ordinance restriction in the Town of Levan. The plaintiff was 
singled out. 
FAILURE OF NOTICE 
Salt Lake County vs Dan L. Kartchner 552 P. 2d 140 (Utah 1976) [11]. The 
method of Service of notice on defendant deserves attention. Here plaintiff dealt with 
valuable property right. Such a situation requires a better method for service of notice 
than that employed by a distributor of handbills. Who could be reasonable sure that a 
handbill stuck inside a screen door would be received, or noted, if it were? It has been 
said that to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process, the notice afforded 
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should be such as is likely to be received and plain to understand. The means employed 
to give notice must be such as one desirous of actually informing a person to be notified 
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it The fundamental test is whether the notice is 
fair and just to the parties involve Actual knowledge cannot operate as a substitute for 
notice required by due process of law, Hence, extraofficial or casual notice is not 
sufficient The criteria is not whether any injury to an individual is possible, but whether 
the requirement as to notice and opportunity to protect property rights affected is just and 
reasonable 16Am.Jur.2d. Constitutional Law, Section 562. The method of service 
employed here did not deserve the kind of response plaintiff claims its notices did not get. 
The Town should have followed the procedure provided in the building permit 
check list in processing the Plaintiffs building permit application. (Plaintiff s house ex 
exhibit) The Plaintiff was not provided the consideration he deserved after submitting 
the application. (Trial page 78&79) The delay of notification of the Town is against 
the policy checklist for permit approval and further has denied the Plaintiff an 
opportunity of knowing what the Town required for approval of a building permit and a 
use of his property 
STREETS AND ANNEXATION 
According to the 1906 plat of the Town of Levan, (Streets 1) discrimination 
existed in the handling of 500 East which had to be given to ex-mayor Golden Mangelson 
for his subdivision, (streets 2)and 300 North (streets 3)or the fence lines of 300 North also 
would have taken priority to the properties the town required to be given up by Keith 
Carter. (Answer to Interrogatories 2/28/2005) changes to streets are statutorily regulated 
(Utah Code Annotated §10-9-23). The Defendants stated the street widths had never 
been changed (May 19, 2005 page 7, 8) but the current mayor told Ludlow Engineering 
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that 300 North had been changed from 99 feet to 66 feet which would give some of the 
homes sufficient setback. 
On May 19, 2005, The Defendants' answered the Plaintiffs April 14 2005 request 
for discovery, Discovery. #12(1) Some of plaintiff s measurements error using Ludlow 
engineering' placement of intersection pins in Levan streets. Property owners expect to 
use these to measurements for the full extent of their property,. #11(2). Never the less, 
the Town states that with a survey, proper measurements can be made and also with the 
use of property lines as established by fences. #17 To the Town's knowledge, the 
(setback) ordinance has been complied with except for a few exceptions set forth in 
response 3. 
The Defendant's would not furnish the separate zoning ordinance which was 
claimed for the Golden Mangelson subdivision setback violations which it testified were 
approved by the Town. ( May 19, 2005 page 12) #12-1, states 3 original street widths 
under Levan's general plan? Levan has not provided evidence of a General Plan (street 
1) 1906 street map. #14, The Town is unaware any (street) width change, or streets that 
deviate from the first platted street width #16 The Town states that street widths have not 
been changed, page 13, There are no streets which deviate from the first platted street 
width. (2#3 even though #3,. #19 500 East and 400 North are continuous on the 1906 
street plat yet a segment of 500 East was given to the Golden Mangleson subdivision but 
a segment of 300 North was taken from Kevin Carter.(see street exhibit) #18, The 
streets were narrowed to allow the property owners sufficient setback to comply with the 
ordinance. Street changes require statutory zoning complicity as do other zoning changes 
and the Town is non-compliant. There is no separate ordinance for the Golden 
Mangelson subdivision provided as requested in discovery and the subdivision is 
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non-compliant with the Town policy and the County Zoning. The Defendant's again 
failed or avoided answering a majority of the pertinent interrogatories. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court interpreted the purported hearing notice in error along with the affidavit 
of ex-mayor Golden Mangelson, The two notices required for public input are absent. 
The burden of proof of the Town's notice compliance, rested with the Defendants who, 
upon being asked to provide the documentation, failed to have the proper record as 
required by (U.C.A. §63-2-301 (1) & 10-9-303(l),(2) requiring municipalities to maintain 
available records of "(a) laws, (c) opinions, orders, proceedings, (e) minutes, report of 
meetings, votes, (g) records of zoning commissions, and (g)(ii) restrictions on the use of 
real property") .and conform to form of ordinance (10-3-704) Without this notice and the 
compliant zoning and planning the setback ordinance is invalid, (section 10, chapter 9 
Utah Code annotated) 
The Burden of proof rests upon the Town The Plaintiff only has access to the 
record in the possession of the Town (U.C.A. 10-3-603) and the Town provided only the 
Mayor's affidavit and the minutes of general council motions for passing the same 30 
foot setback ordinance on three different occasions. 
The Town, obviously would have presented the evidence of a proper zoning had it 
had it. The appellant asked the town to provide proper zoning compliance and 
documentation containing the statutory evidence of its passing. The appellant asked for, 
the general plan, the plat, description and text, map, advance public notice, a planning 
and zoning committee hearing and public notice and hearing from the City Council, also 
for the zoning committee minutes referring to the passage or consideration of the 
anticipated general plan and zoning ordinance or even the names of a planning and zoning 
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committee. The town did not provide the statutory documentation. The Defendants 
Answers failed to respond to or provide the documentation requested in discovery on 
March 23, 2005 March 18, 2005 by the Plaintiff. 
The minutes of the Town council in general session passed the same ordinance 3 
times, 1980, 1981, and 1983. The town asserts that it held a public meeting and provided 
statutory notice. The evidence of planning and zoning is blatantly missing. The Plaintiff 
repeatedly attempted to impress the Court with the lack of a zoning record.. The Court 
erred in the interpretation of the facts before it. The documents (zoning 6,7, and 8) would 
further suggest that there was no Master Plan existing as required, (U.C.A. 10-9-204, 
10-9-301, 10-9-302, 10-9-303) since the documents show that the Town is still 
considering adopting a general plan and a zoning plan to get grants etc. 
The Town states that it has a general plan (Defendants' Response 5/19/05, page 6) 
The Town hasn't provided evidence of this. 
Without a public notice and the other records, the Town's purported general plan, 
zoning plan and the setback ordinance are invalid, (section 10, chapter 9 Utah Code 
annotated) 
Houses are given building permit approval with fabricated setback measurement. 
When a house is in place, the town states it does not make an effort at enforcement. The 
plaintiffs house existed for over 8 years prior to the plaintiffs purchase, then is singled 
out for prosecution after a change of ownership. 
On March 14,2005 the Defendants' discovery answers state the only setback 
violations they want considered are those where a garage may have been converted to a 
home. The Defendants deny nearly every request of documents from the Plaintiff that it 
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has authority for. The Town admits that Plaintiff did apply for a building permit which it 
states was for converting a garage into a home (5/19/05 page 3) 
On May 19, 2005, The Defendants' answered the Plaintiffs April 14 2005 request 
for discovery#17, The Town is unaware of any other residences of Town officers or 
Town employees which violate the set back ordinance. This fails, the Defendants' 
General statement page 13, here they admit they have been given the measurements in a 
52 non-compliant property list with measurements paid for by the Plaintiff, (see exhibit 
setback list & Plaintiffs Discovery 2-28-05) The Defendants fail to contradict the 
setback measurements of the Plaintiff for the 52 homes submitted with setback 
encroachment. The 33 permits provided, by the Town, with this Response show 
unsubstantiated setback measurement (Response page 12) "Levan Town home owners 
were allowed to measure their own setbacks and the Town trusted them to comply with 
the ordinance ". Many permits are absent setback measurements. 
The Defendants admit that other property owners were given permits in the 
setback area but Plaintiffs was refused, this is an arbitrary enforcement decision by the 
Town (July 21, 2005 Bench Trial) which invalidates the 8 year delay in enforcement of 
setback against the Plaintiffs pre-existing structure. Because the Town accepts the word 
of the setback distance on the building permit application, the town has arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily enforced the setback policy 
There is no record of a general or Zoning Plan for the zoning ordinance or a record 
of the adoption, including minutes, text, maps, planning committee, notice for 
community involvement or hearings 
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The Defendant's record of council minutes, notice, and ex-mayor Golden 
Mangelson affidavit, could not support statutory compliance of the zoning adoption and 
the statutory non-compliance of Section 10, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Defendant's failure to statutorily zone invalidates the 30 foot set back 
ordinance. U.C.A. § 10-9-100 l(3)(b). 
The Defendants have violated the legal right of the plaintiff to improve and use his 
property based on a setback ordinance which is invalid 
The Appellant requests the Appeals Court determination for the plaintiff, a grant to 
the continued use of his property as a residence. 
Fees and costs should be awarded to the Appellant See prayer for relief, Maughn 
Memorandum 9/3/04. 
Dated This 3 5 day of MM , 2006 
Reynold Jofansbnfpro se. 
Certificate of Service 
»4 
I, Reynold Johnson, certify that on the £ i " day of M**H , 2006,1 served 2 
copies of the attached Brief of Appellant upon Denton M. Hatch, the counsel for the 
Appellees in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid to the following address: ^JjyJ/^
 rcJ 
Denton M. Hatch, P.C. 
128 West 900 North 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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